To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
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Publication:4153888
DOI10.2307/2296911zbMath0376.90039OpenAlexW2091654011MaRDI QIDQ4153888
Publication date: 1977
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/95b4c93dd6fb68ad2f0055c50db116c6f6724f23
Related Items (11)
Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects ⋮ Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation ⋮ A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution ⋮ Network pollution games ⋮ Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty ⋮ Pollution control by options trading ⋮ AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ⋮ New Results for Network Pollution Games ⋮ On the cheating problem in Stackelberg games† ⋮ Environmental regulation in project-based industries
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