Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions

DOI10.2307/2297063zbMath0378.90008OpenAlexW2007029350MaRDI QIDQ4158197

Amoz Kats, Arthur T. Denzau

Publication date: 1977

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297063

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (11)

Pareto optimality in spatial voting models ⋮ On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models ⋮ Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution ⋮ Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting ⋮ Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation ⋮ Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact ⋮ Candidate behavior under mixed motives ⋮ Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models ⋮ A model of stability and persistence in a democracy ⋮ Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models ⋮ On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

This page was built for publication: Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions