Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations

DOI10.2307/1913953zbMath0388.90007OpenAlexW2062870026MaRDI QIDQ4170488

John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913953

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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