Combinatorial agency

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.010zbMath1258.91082OpenAlexW4252711114MaRDI QIDQ417616

Michal Feldman, Eyal Winter, Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentivescontractsagency theoryhidden-action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (15)

Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts ⋮ Learning approximately optimal contracts ⋮ Learning approximately optimal contracts ⋮ Online team formation under different synergies ⋮ Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization ⋮ Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality ⋮ Contribution games in networks ⋮ Exploiting social influence in networks ⋮ Mechanism design with a restricted action space ⋮ Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: An evolutionary approach ⋮ Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies ⋮ Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability ⋮ Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design ⋮ Optimal task assignments ⋮ The Complexity of Contracts

Cites Work

• Joint production in teams
• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Contracting with Externalities

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