Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.008zbMath1258.91032OpenAlexW1983714462MaRDI QIDQ417628

Sebastian Kranz, Susanne Goldlücke

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

computational methodsrepeated gamesimperfect public monitoringmonetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels ⋮ Even up: maintaining relationships ⋮ Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality

Uses Software

• R
• repgames

Cites Work

• Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• Computing Supergame Equilibria
• Multiparametric Linear Programming
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

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