The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.019zbMath1258.91037OpenAlexW3126143661MaRDI QIDQ417632

David Gill, Daniel Sgroi

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.019

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningmarketingbiasinformation transmissiontestcertificationproduct launchreviewersoft testtough test

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (13)

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors ⋮ Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy ⋮ Testing, disclosure and approval ⋮ A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces ⋮ Constrained persuasion with private information ⋮ On the value of persuasion by experts ⋮ Project screening with tiered evaluation ⋮ Sequential decisions with tests ⋮ Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision ⋮ Experimental design to persuade

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimizing information in the herd: Guinea pigs, profits, and welfare
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Sharing information in web communities
• The wisdom of the minority
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Oligopolistic Certification
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Information Acquisition in Auctions

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