Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:417640
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021zbMath1258.91083OpenAlexW2010750538MaRDI QIDQ417640
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021
Related Items (9)
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Fault tolerance in large games ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Adversarial behavior in network games
Cites Work
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Manipulation through bribes
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Incentives in Teams
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
