Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
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Publication:417675
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.006zbMath1279.91079OpenAlexW2084451112MaRDI QIDQ417675
Konstantin Sonin, Brendan Daley, Michael Schwarz
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.006
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Auctions with entry
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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