Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001zbMath1279.91069OpenAlexW3122503113MaRDI QIDQ417681

Yukio Koriyama, Hans Peter Grüner

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingex post efficiencyparticipation constraintspublic goods provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items

Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

Cites Work

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