Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001zbMath1279.91046OpenAlexW3023592121MaRDI QIDQ417684

Magnus Hoffmann, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

contestsStackelberg gameendogenous timingCournot-Nash gameendogenous prize

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games ⋮ Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations ⋮ Manipulation of moves in sequential contests ⋮ Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests ⋮ Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests

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