Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.005zbMath1279.91016OpenAlexW2040968216MaRDI QIDQ417688

Chun-Hsien Yeh, Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumairport problemconverse consistencybilateral consistencyconstrained equal benefits rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• The prenucleolus and the reduced game property: Equal treatment replaces anonymity
• Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
• A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Distributive justice in taxation
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• The converse consistency principle in bargaining.
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Multilateral Bargaining
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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