Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
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Publication:417690
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007zbMath1279.91012OpenAlexW3122879897MaRDI QIDQ417690
Matthew O. Jackson, Xu Tan, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007
Nash equilibriumglobal gamesBayesian gameselectronic mail gameepsilon-equilibriumepsilon-Nash equilibriumlower hemi-continuitytrembling-hand perfection
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