Profit-maximizing matchmaker

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.017zbMath1279.91121OpenAlexW2089893178MaRDI QIDQ417692

Hideo Konishi, Chiu Yu Ko

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.017

zbMATH Keywords

coreimplementationstrong Nash equilibriummenu auction gameresource allocation problemsimplified mechanismstable assignmenttwo-sided matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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