Communication and efficiency in auctions
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Publication:417694
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.10.002zbMath1279.91086OpenAlexW2093733100MaRDI QIDQ417694
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (6)
To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions ⋮ Nonlinear pricing with finite information ⋮ Mechanism design with a restricted action space ⋮ The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms ⋮ Asking questions ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design
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- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Efficient and Competitive Rationing
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Coarse Matching
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