Communication and efficiency in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.10.002zbMath1279.91086OpenAlexW2093733100MaRDI QIDQ417694

Nenad Kos

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommunication complexitymessage space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions ⋮ Nonlinear pricing with finite information ⋮ Mechanism design with a restricted action space ⋮ The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms ⋮ Asking questions ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design

Cites Work

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• The communication cost of selfishness
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Efficient and Competitive Rationing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Coarse Matching

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