Forward induction equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.004zbMath1279.91013OpenAlexW2086717934MaRDI QIDQ417699

Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

invarianceequilibrium refinementforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Strong forward induction

Cites Work

• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• Normal form structures in extensive form games
• Forward induction and public randomization
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• On Forward Induction
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games

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