Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
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Publication:417713
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005zbMath1280.91089OpenAlexW2112244835MaRDI QIDQ417713
David Pérez-Castrillo, Geoffroy de Clippel, David Wettstein
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171305
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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