Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem

DOI10.1287/moor.3.1.1zbMath0394.90114OpenAlexW2158919722MaRDI QIDQ4177374

Norman Shapiro, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.1.1

zbMATH Keywords

VotingLimit TheoremCooperative GameCoalitionMajority GameValues of Large Games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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