Optimal Redistributive Taxation When Individual Welfare Depends Upon Relative Income

DOI10.2307/1883177zbMath0397.90011OpenAlexW1990206896WikidataQ55969934 ScholiaQ55969934MaRDI QIDQ4181547

Eytan Sheshinski, Michael Boskin

Publication date: 1978

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1883177

zbMATH Keywords

Individual WelfareOptimal Redistributive TaxationProgressive Income TaxationPublic PoliciesRelative Income

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

Optimal taxation in the presence of income-dependent relative income effects ⋮ Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a production economy ⋮ Conspicuous consumption, economic growth, and taxation ⋮ Popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis ⋮ Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy ⋮ Consumption peer effects and utility needs in India ⋮ Status and welfare under monopolistic competition ⋮ Higher tax and less work: reverse ``keep up with the Joneses and rising inequality ⋮ The two sides of envy ⋮ Veblen's theory of the leisure class revisited: implications for optimal income taxation ⋮ GENUINE SAVING AND POSITIONAL EXTERNALITIES ⋮ Why income comparison is rational ⋮ Reconciling the Rawlsian and the utilitarian approaches to the maximization of social welfare ⋮ THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND THE DEMAND FOR STATUS ⋮ Growth and the relativity of satisfaction ⋮ Keeping up with the Joneses: who loses out?

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