Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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Publication:4184582
DOI10.2307/1912346zbMath0399.90008OpenAlexW1548462700WikidataQ56028152 ScholiaQ56028152MaRDI QIDQ4184582
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ac7d4fff35c7852ecabc49b09a0e8032af23af48
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)
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