Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies

DOI10.2307/2297085zbMath0401.90004OpenAlexW1971497779MaRDI QIDQ4186026

Eugene Wesley, Elisha A. Pazner

Publication date: 1978

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/155.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Social ChoicePlurality RuleCheatproofnessLarge SocietiesMisrepresenting the PreferencesTactical VotingVoting Scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals ⋮ The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule ⋮ Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election ⋮ Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies

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