Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4186027
DOI10.2307/2297259zbMath0401.90005OpenAlexW2003110454MaRDI QIDQ4186027
Publication date: 1978
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297259
InstabilityArrow's Impossibility TheoremPolitical ProcessesSimple Dynamic GamesSimple Majority Voting Game
Related Items (34)
Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control ⋮ Structural instability of the core ⋮ The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ The uncovered set in spatial voting games ⋮ The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the politics of ideology ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions ⋮ Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games ⋮ Smooth social choice ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter ⋮ On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the `chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment ⋮ Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions ⋮ Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView ⋮ Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria ⋮ Structural instability of decision majority rules ⋮ Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting ⋮ Existence of a multicameral core ⋮ Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension ⋮ The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates ⋮ The instability of instability of centered distributions ⋮ The almost surely shrinking yolk ⋮ A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model ⋮ The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas ⋮ Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice ⋮ A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models ⋮ Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets ⋮ Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold ⋮ The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
This page was built for publication: Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
