Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces
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Publication:4188993
DOI10.1287/moor.1.2.144zbMath0403.90003OpenAlexW2024181435MaRDI QIDQ4188993
Richard D. McKelvey, Richard E. Wendell
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.144
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