Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.09.001zbMath1237.91163OpenAlexW2034311635MaRDI QIDQ419407

Junnosuke Shino, Ryo Kawasaki

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2008-08.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (4)

Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets

Cites Work

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• Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
• Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly ``lumpy public goods
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Farsighted stability in average return games
• Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Spatial Competition with a Land Market: Hotelling and Von Thunen Unified

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