scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767
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Publication:4196192
zbMath0408.90003MaRDI QIDQ4196192
Publication date: 1978
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Game Theoretic ModelGroup DecisionMisrevelation of PreferenceStrategic FormStrategy-ProofVoting Games in Normal Form
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
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