The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market

DOI10.1287/mnsc.25.3.243zbMath0409.90016OpenAlexW2092372248MaRDI QIDQ4197581

Jean Pierre Ponssard

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/31a6d5fccf09f0a6b205b2d13e481bb20f098b71

zbMATH Keywords

MarketingMarket StructureGame Theoretic ModelCompetitive FirmsIncentives for CooperationInnformation AvailabilityOligopolyY

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99)

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