Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2011.12.003zbMath1238.91056OpenAlexW2269108872MaRDI QIDQ420828

Michael Zuckerman, Edith Elkind, Yoram Bachrach, Piotr Faliszewski

Publication date: 23 May 2012

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2011.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

complexityweighted voting gamesmanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (15)

Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups ⋮ Proof systems and transformation games ⋮ Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota ⋮ The inverse Shapley value problem ⋮ Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences ⋮ Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games ⋮ Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights ⋮ Average weights and power in weighted voting games ⋮ Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value ⋮ Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning ⋮ Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights ⋮ Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications ⋮ Mathematical and computational modeling of political systems ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Structural control in weighted voting games

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