Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.039zbMath1238.91077OpenAlexW2050848042MaRDI QIDQ420898

Ching-Chung Kuo, Zhen Li

Publication date: 23 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.039

zbMATH Keywords

nonlinear programmingrevenue maximizationauctions/biddingdiscrete bidDutch auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• Slow Dutch Auctions
• Revenue Ranking of Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders
• BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders
• Nonlinear Programming

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