Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.024zbMath1237.91118OpenAlexW2015377529MaRDI QIDQ421564

Carles Rafels, F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.02.024

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescoreassignment gamedoubly dominant diagonal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Assignment games with stable core
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• Inventory games.
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Assignment Problems
• Minimum cost spanning tree games
• On the core of linear production games
• Cost allocation in continuous-review inventory models

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