Coalitional games: monotonicity and core

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.025zbMath1237.91024OpenAlexW2042943244MaRDI QIDQ421739

Vincent Feltkamp, Javier Arin

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.025

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitycoreTU gamesper capita nucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ The SD-prenucleolus for TU games ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

Cites Work

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• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Observations on the nucleolus and the central game
• Serial Cost Sharing
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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