Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
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Publication:421791
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.08.011zbMath1237.91027OpenAlexW2090854437MaRDI QIDQ421791
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.08.011
Related Items (30)
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification ⋮ Order monotonic solutions for generalized characteristic functions ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure ⋮ Preservation of risk in capital markets ⋮ Axioms of invariance for TU-games ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ The balanced contributions property for symmetric players ⋮ Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values ⋮ A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value ⋮ Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value ⋮ A fuzzy cooperative game theoretic approach for multinational water resource spatiotemporal allocation ⋮ A linear proportional effort allocation rule ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games ⋮ Extension of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE ⋮ A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance ⋮ Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? ⋮ Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value ⋮ Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities ⋮ On a class of solidarity values ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
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