COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES

DOI10.1111/j.1467-999X.1994.tb00018.xzbMath0925.90406MaRDI QIDQ4218560

Güth, Werner, Kliemt, Hartmut

Publication date: 11 January 1999

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (7)

The emergence of deontological codes in public administration ⋮ TRUST, VALUES, AND FALSE CONSENSUS ⋮ Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning. ⋮ On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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