Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00058zbMath0910.90279OpenAlexW2012633648MaRDI QIDQ4219777

Joel Watson

Publication date: 10 November 1998

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00058

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriumtwo-sided incomplete informationalternating-offer bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (15)

Bargaining in endogenous trading networks ⋮ BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ The impact of available information on negotiation results ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms ⋮ UNIONS' RELATIVE CONCERNS AND STRIKES IN WAGE BARGAINING ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information

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