The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting

DOI10.2307/3440580zbMath0914.90085OpenAlexW1521428310MaRDI QIDQ4223363

Dieter Bös, Christoph Lülfesmann

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3440580

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractsrenegotiationtwo-period procurement model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment

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