Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0282-xzbMath1274.91232OpenAlexW2038984260MaRDI QIDQ422349

Ram Orzach, David A. Malueg

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0282-x

zbMATH Keywords

second-price auctionfirst-price auctionrevenue comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

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