Sequential share bargaining

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0286-6zbMath1274.91225OpenAlexW3023610081MaRDI QIDQ422357

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0286-6

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamessubgame perfect equilibriumnoncooperative bargainingunanimous agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (3)

Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems ⋮ Self-interest and equity concerns: a behavioural allocation rule for operational problems

Cites Work

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• Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations
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• Multilateral Bargaining

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