A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
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Publication:422368
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0291-9zbMath1274.91045OpenAlexW2030361769MaRDI QIDQ422368
Carles Rafels, Josep Maria Izquierdo
Publication date: 16 May 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (3)
A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games
Cites Work
- A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- Quasi-cores in bargaining sets
- On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- Cores of convex games
- Convex games and stable sets
- An existence theorem for a bargaining set
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
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