The Trivial Object and the Non-Uiviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions

DOI10.1080/11663081.1998.10510937zbMath0934.03035OpenAlexW2061639258WikidataQ29031811 ScholiaQ29031811MaRDI QIDQ4236064

Graham Priest

Publication date: 25 April 2000

Published in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.1998.10510937

zbMATH Keywords

fixed pointsemantic paradoxestruth predicatedescriptionsdenotationstrong Kleene logicparaconsistent logic LPtrivial object

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Paraconsistent logics (03B53)

Related Items

Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?, Metatheory and dialetheism, Semantic closure, descriptions and non-triviality, On a paradox of Hilbert and Bernays, Prospects for Triviality, Observations on the trivial world

Cites Work

• Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes
• Boolean negation and all that
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• Denotation and description in free logic*
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