Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
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Publication:423715
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012zbMath1239.91047OpenAlexW2016672095MaRDI QIDQ423715
Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012
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