Strategic reasoning in \(p\)-beauty contests
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Publication:423722
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.010zbMath1239.91026OpenAlexW1997921680MaRDI QIDQ423722
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.010
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