A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:423726
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006zbMath1239.91015OpenAlexW2021130486MaRDI QIDQ423726
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.006
robustnessincomplete informationrationalizabilityuniversal type spacehigher-order beliefsextensive-form games
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items
The robust selection of rationalizability ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Common belief foundations of global games
- Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Real Analysis and Probability
- Critical Types
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Extensive Games
