Transparency, complementarity and holdout
From MaRDI portal
Publication:423729
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.003zbMath1239.91066OpenAlexW2788362626MaRDI QIDQ423729
Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/1/MPRA_paper_17606.pdf
efficiencycomplementarityCoase theoremtransparencyholdoutmulti-person bargainingpublic offerssecret offers
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