Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.03.007zbMath1251.91035OpenAlexW2048798070MaRDI QIDQ423750

Bernard Lebrun

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyEnglish auctionsecond-price auctionbehavioral bidding strategiesheterogeneous biddersmultiplicity of equilibriano-regret property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions ⋮ Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ An Auction Approach for Cost and Schedule Management of IT Outsourcing Project ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Collusion via Resale
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

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