Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
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Publication:423765
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.017zbMath1239.91018OpenAlexW2032200533MaRDI QIDQ423765
H. Peyton Young, Bary S. R. Pradelski
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c492c12a-0b1a-4290-9750-65376b6c2ab6
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