Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
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Publication:423775
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.008zbMath1239.91090OpenAlexW2034816036MaRDI QIDQ423775
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.008
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