On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.002zbMath1239.91110OpenAlexW2154721040MaRDI QIDQ423776

Scott Duke Kominers

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityunitaritysubstitutesmany-to-many matchingcontract design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts ⋮ Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result ⋮ Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts ⋮ Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Cites Work

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• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition