On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005zbMath1239.91068OpenAlexW1995834721MaRDI QIDQ423778

Laurent Lamy

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionscombinatorial auctionsbidder-optimal competitive equilibriumcore-selecting auctionsVickrey payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

An efficient ascending auction for private valuations ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

Cites Work

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• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Combinatorial auction design
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

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