Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.011zbMath1239.91029OpenAlexW2060056150MaRDI QIDQ423781

Patrick W. Schmitz, Petra Nieken

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13182/

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentrepeated moral hazardsequential hidden actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
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• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*

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