Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship

DOI10.1111/1467-9442.00078zbMath0949.91515OpenAlexW2107009932MaRDI QIDQ4256245

Roland Strausz

Publication date: 28 November 2000

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/collusion-and-renegotiation-in-a-principalsupervisoragent-relationship(e10db550-4347-4e64-bf32-1c79b30febc0).html

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion ⋮ Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats

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