First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008zbMath1239.91069OpenAlexW2093289339MaRDI QIDQ425709

Pierre-Henri Morand, François Maréchal

Publication date: 8 June 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryrisk aversionauctionexpected revenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions

Cites Work

• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions

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