Firm competition and incentive pay: rent seeking at work

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.06.006zbMath1239.91089OpenAlexW1969440886MaRDI QIDQ425716

Mikael Priks

Publication date: 8 June 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

competitionrent seekingpayment methods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
• Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking
• A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

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